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The BAROMETER is a student weekly newspaper for the exchange of ideas 
and Information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items of 
Interest, papers, and articles of interest to the students, staff, and 
faculty as a whole are solicited. 
+¢+¢+¢+¢+¢+¢ 
Welcome aboard or welcome back, as the case may be. With the summer break behind us the 
student body, as usual, Is anxiously looking ahead to the new quarter! The BAROMETER is 
being delivered, this Issue only, to Introduce It to the new students and to remind the 
veterans that the paper Is still alive and well. The BAROMETER Is an "in house" publication 
Intended as a convenient vehicle for the exchange of student Ideas and a method of alerting 
the readers to articles of Interest. By dropping a note to the editors at their SMC's -
all articles and comments are welcomed. 
The BAROMETER sends along a special welcome aboard to the new Superintendent, Rear 
Admiral Linder, and his family and our best wishes with the Freemans as they journey to 
their retirement home In Virginia. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: In our effort to provide stimulating articles we have solicited material 
from a myriad of sources. Many of the journals we use are familiar to most of the student 
body and faculty. However, once In a while we are privileged to Introduce a new periodical. 
We do so with this Issue. 
The Strate¥lc Review Is a quarterly publication. Its stated purpose is to "fi 11 an 
existIng need or an organization, not affiliated with a particular military service, 
for the study and discussion of problems of national security In the nuclear age. Its 
aim Is to contribute to that Informed understanding and debate essential In a democracy 
to the wise conduct of foreign policy and national defense as they affect the security 
and vital Interests of the United States" ..• lt Is published by the United States Strategic 
Institute In Washington, D.C. The following are listed as the directors: 
Arthur G. B. Metcalf Lt.Gen. Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Ret.) 
Chairman Vice Chairman 
Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN (RET.) 
President 
Richard R. Glendon 
Secretary and Treasurer 
Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret.) 
Vice Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, USN (Ret.) 
Hon . Clare Boothe Luce 
STRATEGIC STUDIES EDITOR 
Arthur G. B. Metcalf 
Vice Adm. Harold D. Baker, USN (Ret.) 
Vice President 
General Bruce K. Holloway, .USAF (Ret.) 
Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane, USA (Ret.) 
Hon. William D. Pawley 
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF 
Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Lane, USA (Ret.) 
SOVIET STUDIES EDITOR 
John Erickson 
Briefly the offerings In the Winter 1974 edition were: 
·'NATO AND U.S. FORCES: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA 
THE AUTHOR: General Andrew J. Goodpaster was commissioned from the U.s. Military Academy 
In 1939. In World War II, he led the 48th Engineer Combat Battalion through campaigns In 
North Africa and Italy, subsequently returning to the U.S. for staff duty. After receiving 
a master's degree In engineering and a Ph.D. in International relations, he served with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe. He commanded the 
8th Infantry Division In Europe, and served successively as Special Assistant to the 
. ' . .:., 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Joint Staff, Deputy Commander of 
U.S. Forces in Vietnam and Senior Military Advisor to the Paris Peace Delegation, before 
taking up his present assignment as Supreme Commander, Europe, on May 5, 1969. 
IN BRIEF: The two objectives of NATO are deterrence and defense. NATO conventional 
defense forces lie between the high-ris~ 'trip-wire
' 
concept and the low-risk, full-
conventional capability. Their design and readiness require close coordination with the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons and with political policy. To be effective, the Alliance 
must achieve unity of purpose and action. As it does so, its capacity to promote d~tente 
will increase. NATO facts the MBFR negotiations with inferior forces, inferior position 
and a defensive psychology, seeking to draw constructive and balanced force reducations 
from negotiations. In these negotiations, NATO is weakened by euphoria derived from the 
act of negotiatIng, and by the capacity of the other side to exploit the divergent interests 
of the allies. It may be necessary for NATO to consider problems beyond its immediate 
mission but which have an adverse effect on the solidarity of the Alliance. In recent 
years, the Warsaw Pact forces have greatly enlarged their numbers and armament in Central 
Europe while the NATO powers, despite weapons improvemeats, have declined in strength. 
Through joint exercises, every effort is made to maintain a high state of readiness for ~ 
NATO forces. Despite its economic strength, Europe is politically and militarily weak. 
NATO remains essential to European security. The security of Europe and of the United 
States are so interrelated that U.S. forces in NATO are also defending the United States. 
Teh U.S. contributions of forces and funds to the NATO defense are a prudent investment in 
our own security." 
liTHE FOURTH ARAB-I SRAELI WAR by Li eutenant Genera I Ira C. Eaker, USAF (RET.). THE AUTHOR: 
Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, Commanding General of the 8th U.S. Army Air Force and 
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces in World War II and since retirement, successively an 
industry executive and syndicated columnist, started life as a Texan in Llano County. 
After graduation from Southeastern Normal in Durant, Oklahoma, he entered the Army in 1917, 
as a sutdent in the First Officers Training Camp and was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant. 
He completed his flying training in 1918, in 1927 was a pilot on the Army Air Corps Pan-
American Goodwill Flight, and in 1929 was chief pilot of the IQuestionmark,1 which set a 
world endurance record for sustained fl ight, refueling in air. His service between the 
wars included eight years on the Air Staff in Washington, after which he commanded 
successively the 17th and 20th Pursuit Groups. Postwar, his last active duty assignment 
was as Deputy Commanding General, Army Air Forces and Chief of Air Staff from 1945 to 194-. 
IN BRIEF: The October, 1973, Arab-Israeli war had deep roots in history and more immediate 
causation in events since reation of the State of Israel. The Arabs launched a surprise 
attack to restore prestige and position lost in the defeat of the 1967 war and to force 
new negotiations for the return of occupied territory. Arab forces had roughly a four-to-
one overall superiority of men and weapons. They attacked with massive armor and with 
unprecedented field missile .deployment. After initial success, they were defeated, first 
in Syria and then In Egypt. Losses were heavy on both sides. The Soviet Union shipped 
replacement arms and ammunition to the Arabs and the United States shipped supporting 
munitions to Israel. Soviet-American diplomacy finally achieved a cease-fire, under 
United Nations auspices. The war has had far-reaching economic and political effects on 
both sides, with the Soviet Union the big winner and the United States the big 10ser.11 
"MILITARY AIRLIFT FOR STRATEGIC MOBILITY by General Paul K. Carlton, USAF. THE AUTHOR: 
General Carlton is Commander of the Military Airlift Command with headquarters at Scott 
Air Force Base, Illinois. He was commissioned from the Army Air Corps cadet program in 
1942, flew B-29 aircraft from India and China in World War II, and served with the 
Strategic Air Command in varied staff and command positions, at headquarters and in the 
field, until 1968. He then took command of the 1st Strategic Aerospace Division at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, but returned to SAC Headquarters in 1969 as Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Operations. Later in 1969, he was assigned to command the 15th Air Force at 
March Air Force Base, California. He took his present command in 1972. IN BRIEF: 
Increases in military airlift capacity have made some dramatic changes in the strategic ~ 
mobility of forces and in the logistical capabil ity of air supply. Strategic planning, 
logistical calculations and cost effectiveness studies must be updated to accommodate 
this new movement potential, demonstrated in support of South Vietnam against the 1972 
North Vietnamese offensive, and of Israel in the October, 1973, war.11 
liTHE POLITICAL BALANCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF by Dr. Alvin J. Cottreell. THE AUTHOR~ 
Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell is Director of Research of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Georgetown University. He received his B.S. degree from Temple University and 
M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. He has served as Instructor 
and Research Associate at the University of Pennsylvania, as Staff Member of the Weapons 
Systems Evaluation Group, at the Strategic Studies Center of Stanford University and on the 
Faculty of the National War College 1964-67. His papers and books, including special 
studies on the Middle East, have been widely published. He authoried ICyprus Between East 
and West l (Johns Hopkins Press, 1968). He served as Project Director of a Conference on 
the Indian Ocean in March 1971 and as co-editor of the monograph, IThe Indian Ocean: Its 
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Political, Economic and Military Importance, I (Praeger, 1972). In September, 1972 he 
chaired an International Conference in Palma, Mallorca dealing with the Western Mediterranean 
and co-authored the Washington Paper entitled, 'politics, Oil, in the Western Mediterranean,' 
(Library Press, 1973). He is also co-author of a book entitled, 'The Western Mediterranean" 
Its Political, Military and Economic Importance,' to be published by Praeger in 1974." 
"NATO AND THE AGING PROCESS by General T. R. Milton, USAF. THE AUTHOR: General T. R. 
Milton Is United States Representative, NATO Military Committee, Brussels. He entered the 
U.S. Military Academy from the Regular Army and graduated In 1940. He served with the 
Eighth Air Force in England in World War II and returned to Europe as Chief of Staff for 
the Berlin Alrllfe Task Force In 1948. His service includes, In addition to Air Force 
command and staff assignments with Transport and Bombardment Aviation, duty as - Thirteenth 
Air Force Commander; Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, PACOM; Inspector 
General of the USAF and Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee, before assuming his present 
duties In August 1971. IN BRIEF: The 011 crisis highlights the present limits of European 
unity. NATO countries fare other difficulties in the unpopularity of military conscription, 
the obscuring effect of detent, the pinch of budget restrictions. Some of the NATO powers 
have reduced their force contributions. The concurrent Increases in Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact forces pose grave questions for NATO defenses just as the United States in debating 
a possible reduction of its contribution. European members of the alliance point out 
that NATO is also a defense of the United States and its Interests. They are not likely 
to Increase their contributions, will In fact have difficulty holding present levels. 
Thus an American withdrawal might well cause the collapse of NATO. Substantial reduction 
of force contributions would have Incalculable but potentially disastrous effects on NATO." 
"IMPERATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S WAR POWERS by J. Terry Emerson. THE AUTHOR: J. Terry 
Emerson is Legislative Assistant to Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. He graduated 
from Elon College summa cum laude in 1956, took his LLB at Duke University in 1959 and 
received a Richardson Foundation Congressional Fellowship for 1959-1960. He then served 
as an Assistant Counsel, Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate, 1960-1969 before 
assuming his present duties. IN BRIEF: 1973 passage of a congressional war powers bill, 
over a presidential veto, marked the culmination of dissension over our frustrating war in 
Vietnam. Other attacks on presidential authorities included efforts to mandate overseas 
troop ceilings, to curtail executive agreements and to terminate foreign base agreements. 
The War Powers Resolution affects to establish congressional control over the commitment 
of U.S. forces to undeclared war. It requires the President to terminate commitment of 
U.S. forces to combat In or reinforcement of any foreign power within sixty days unless 
Congress shall authorized extended commitments. This Resolution is at once a curtailment 
of presidential power and an extension of congressional power over the conduct of war. 
It defies the experience of and Intent of the framers of the Constitution that legislative 
bodies are Inherently Ill-qualified to wage war. The intent of the founding to authorize 
Congress to declare war did not contemplate that Congress should conduct the war. Nor did 
it contemplate that a President would not use the national military powers promptly and 
as necessary to defent the national Interests. Judicial precedent argues against this 
legislative restraint on the President's war powers." 
liTHE STRATEGIC LIMITS OF PROXY WAR by Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (RET.) 
THE AUTHOR: Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak was appointed in the U.S. Naval Academy 
from Colorado in 1930 and commissioned in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1934. He served with 
the Fourth Marines In Shanghai in the mid-thirties. He took paratroop training and 
participated in the operations in the Solomon Islands during World War I I before returning 
to duty in Marine Headquarters in 1944. He then joined the Sixth Marine Division for the 
Invasion of Okinawa and went to China with that unit. During the Korean War, he served 
as Chief of Staff of the First Marine Division. He returned to the United States in 1951 
to serve as Secretary of the General Staff at Headquarters. U.S. Marine Corps. In 
February 1962, General Krulak was called from command of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot. 
San Diego, to serve as Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities to 
the Chairman of tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff. From 1964 to 1968, General Krulak served as 
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces. Pacific. He is now Director of Editorial and 
News Policy of the Copley Newspapers and President of the Copley News Service, San Diego, 
California. IN BRIEF: After a difficult war, conflicting appraisals abound. In Vietnam, 
the United States did achieve worthy goals, though at heavy cost after serious mistakes 
of strategic judgment. Our policy violated ancient precepts of war long ago enunciated by 
Sun Tzu and validated by the record of history. When the Soviet Union launched a satellite 
war, the United States, Instead of oeprating at the Great Power level to creat a climate 
for the success of Its ally, Intervened with Its own forces and became bogged down in the 
conflict. It allowed the advantage of sanctuary to the enemy. It depended heavily on 
conventional warfare, neglecting the morale of its ally and the vital role of the people in 




"LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEAS by Brigadier General Luke W. Finlay, USA (RET.) 
THE AUTHOR: Brigadier General Luke W. Finlay is an international oil lawyer and a specialist 
in the law of the sea. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1928 and served on 
the Nicaragua Canal Survey before resigning in 1931 to attend Yale Law School, from which 
he graduated in 1933. After a teaching fellowship at Yale and four years of practice in 
New York City, he joined the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey as counsel. During World 
War I I, General Finlay served as Executive Officer to the Chief of the U.S. Army Transport-
ation Corps. In 1952-3, he served in Paris as Deputy for Defense Affairs to the U.S. 
Special Representative in Europe. After five years as Jerseyls representative with 
affiliated countries in Europe, he was in 1959 elected President of Esso Mediterranean, Inc. 
From 1963 to 1969, he was in charge of Jersey's Government Relations Department, New 
York, whence he retired to resume the private practice of law. General Finlay is Chariman 
of the American Petroleum Institute's Ad Hoc Committee on Mineral Resources Beneath the 
Seas, a member of the National Petroleum Council IS Committee on Petroleum Resources 
Beneath the Ocean Floor, Vice Chairman of the Committee on Marine Resources of the American 
Bar Association's Section on Natural Resources and a member of other professional 
committees in this field. IN BRIEF: This essay treats critical issues in the Law of 
the Sea which will be considered In the United Nations Conference to be held later this 
year. The author reviews the findings of Captain Sayre A. Swartauber in his excellent 
treatise, 'The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas,1 Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 
(1972), 298 pp., and then anal~zes the author's conclusion. General Finlay holds that 
different territorial limits are set for different purposes, that a single rule for all 
purposes is not practicable nor desirable, that subsurface rights in a continental shelf 
appertain to the coastal nations and are claimed by other such nations, that the United 
States should not surrender these rights in a misguided attempt to serve other purposes 
or to achieve some unattainable uniformity of international law." 
We wish to emphasize that this review of the entire publication looks suspiciously 
like a "plug", whereas the fact of the matter is simply that the editors were so impressed 
with the relevance and professionalism of the articles, broad dissemination seemed 
appropriate. 
We are indebted to Professor Fuhs of the Aero Department for bringing this worthwhile 
publication to our attention and to the staff of the library for promptly including The 
Strategic Review in our inventory of professional reading. 
